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Objective: With the ARX data anonymization tool structured biomedical data can be de-identified using
syntactic privacy models, such as k-anonymity. Data is transformed with two methods: (a) generalization
of attribute values, followed by (b) suppression of data records. The former method results in data that is
well suited for analyses by epidemiologists, while the latter method significantly reduces loss of informa-
tion. Our tool uses an optimal anonymization algorithm that maximizes output utility according to a
given measure. To achieve scalability, existing optimal anonymization algorithms exclude parts of the
search space by predicting the outcome of data transformations regarding privacy and utility without
explicitly applying them to the input dataset. These optimizations cannot be used if data is transformed
with generalization and suppression. As optimal data utility and scalability are important for anonymiz-
ing biomedical data, we had to develop a novel method.
Methods: In this article, we first confirm experimentally that combining generalization with suppression
significantly increases data utility. Next, we proof that, within this coding model, the outcome of data
transformations regarding privacy and utility cannot be predicted. As a consequence, existing algorithms
fail to deliver optimal data utility. We confirm this finding experimentally. The limitation of previous
work can be overcome at the cost of increased computational complexity. However, scalability is impor-
tant for anonymizing data with user feedback. Consequently, we identify properties of datasets that may
be predicted in our context and propose a novel and efficient algorithm. Finally, we evaluate our solution
with multiple datasets and privacy models.
Results: This work presents the first thorough investigation of which properties of datasets can be pre-
dicted when data is anonymized with generalization and suppression. Our novel approach adopts exist-
ing optimization strategies to our context and combines different search methods. The experiments show
that our method is able to efficiently solve a broad spectrum of anonymization problems.
Conclusion: Our work shows that implementing syntactic privacy models is challenging and that existing
algorithms are not well suited for anonymizing data with transformation models which are more com-
plex than generalization alone. As such models have been recommended for use in the biomedical
domain, our results are of general relevance for de-identifying structured biomedical data.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Collaborative collection and sharing of sensitive personal data
have become an important element of biomedical research. To pro-
tect patient privacy in complex research environments, a broad
spectrum of safeguards must be implemented, including legal, con-
tractual as well as technical methods. Data anonymization is a cen-
tral building block in this context. It aims at sanitizing datasets in
ways that prevent attackers from breaching the subjects’ privacy. Anumber of incidents have shown that simply removing all directly
identifying information (e.g. names) is not sufficient [1–3]. As a
consequence, different definitions of privacy and techniques for
sanitizing datasets have been proposed [4–7]. As sanitization inevi-
tably leads to loss of information and thus a decrease in data util-
ity, a balance has to be sought between privacy risks on one side
and suitability for a specific use case on the other.
According to national laws, such as the US Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [8], and international
regulations, such as the European Directive on Data Protection
[9], different methods may be used. In particular, the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule defines two basic methods for de-identifying datasets
[10]. The first method requires the removal or the modification
38 F. Kohlmayer et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 58 (2015) 37–48of a pre-defined set of attributes and attribute values. The second
method, which is called ‘‘expert determination” requires that a pro-
fessional ‘‘determines that the risk is very small that the information
could be used [. . .] to identify an individual” [10]. For this purpose,
methods of statistical disclosure control may be used.
In this work, we will focus on statistical disclosure control for
structured data, which can be represented in a tabular form with
each row corresponding to the data about one individual [6].
Specifically, we will describe methods implemented in ARX, a data
anonymization tool that we have developed for the biomedical
domain [11,12]. A typical use case is the de-identification of
research data prior to sharing. To our knowledge, ARX offers the
most comprehensive support of methods for anonymizing struc-
tured data to date. Its highlights include methods for risk analyses,
risk-based anonymization, syntactic privacy models and methods
for automated and manual analysis of data utility. Moreover, the
tool implements an intuitive coding model, is highly scalable and
provides a sophisticated graphical user interface with several wiz-
ards and visualizations that guide users through different aspects
of the anonymization process.
1.1. Background
ARX implements methods that offer dynamic means for balanc-
ing privacy risks with data utility. Privacy requirements are
expressed in the form of syntactic privacy criteria. Data is trans-
formed with coding models, in particular generalization and sup-
pression of attribute values, to ensure that they fulfill the
specified privacy requirements. Risk models are used to estimate
risks of re-identification, which are an inherent aspect of many pri-
vacy models. Finally, utility measures are used to estimate the
suitability of the resulting datasets for specific usage scenarios. A
balancing of privacy and utility is achieved through user feedback:
by choosing different privacy models, risk estimates, transforma-
tion methods, and utility measures as well as by varying the
parameters which regulate the different steps.
When anonymizing structured data, the general attack vector
assumed is linkage of a sensitive dataset with an identified datasetFig. 1. Generalization hierarchies for attributes age, gender and diagnosis. Values of the attr
the attribute gender can only be suppressed. Diagnoses are grouped by anatomy.
Table 1
Example dataset and a privacy-preserving transformation. Age and gender are quasi-identifiers
entries have been suppressed. The transformed dataset fulfills 2-anonymity regarding the
Quasi-identifying Sensitive
Age Gender Diagnosis
34 Male Colon cancer
22 Female Stroke
66 Male Stroke
70 Male Colon cancer
35 Female Colon cancer
21 Male Stroke
18 Female Colon cancer
19 Female Stroke(or similar background knowledge about individuals). The attri-
butes that may be used for linkage are termed quasi-identifiers
(or indirect identifiers, or keys). Such attributes are not identifiers
per se but may in combination be used for linkage. Moreover, it is
assumed that they cannot simply be removed from the dataset as
they may be required for analyses and that they are likely to be
available to an attacker. Furthermore, it is assumed that directly
identifying information (such as names) has already been removed
from the dataset. An example dataset with different types of attri-
butes is shown in Table 1. The semantics of sensitive attributes will
be explained in Section 2.1.
Datasets are often protected against identity disclosure
(or re-identification), which means that an individual can be linked
to a specific data entry [3]. This is a very important type of attack,
as it has legal consequences for data owners according to many
laws and regulations worldwide. Protection may be imple-
mented with the k-anonymity privacy model [3]. A dataset is
k-anonymous if, regarding the quasi-identifiers, each data item
cannot be distinguished from at least k 1 other data items. This
property can be used to define equivalence classes of indistinguish-
able entries [13,13a]. The output dataset from Table 1 fulfills
2-anonymity.
When data is anonymized, values of quasi-identifiers are trans-
formed to ensure that the data fulfills privacy requirements. In ARX
this data recoding is primarily performed with generalization hier-
archies. Examples are shown in Fig. 1. Here, values of the attribute
age are first transformed into age groups and then suppressed,
while values of the attribute gender can only be suppressed. Diag-
noses can be grouped by anatomy, nosology or etiology. Anatomy
has been used in the example. Generalization hierarchies are well
suited for categorical attributes. They can also be used for contin-
uous attributes by performing categorization. In the example from
Table 1, the attribute age is generalized to the first level of the
according hierarchy.
To create anonymized datasets of high quality, ARX combines
attribute generalization with the suppression of data records. This
means that entries from equivalence classes that violate the pri-
vacy model (i.e. outliers) are automatically replaced withibute age are first transformed into age groups and then suppressed, while values of
, diagnosis is a sensitive attribute. The attribute age has been generalized. The last two
quasi-identifiers and distinct-2-diversity regarding the sensitive attribute.
Quasi-identifying Sensitive
Age Gender Diagnosis
20–39 Male Colon cancer
20–39 Female Stroke
60–79 Male Stroke
60–79 Male Colon cancer
20–39 Female Colon cancer
20–39 Male Stroke
H H H
H H H
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records is kept under a given threshold. With a threshold
0 6 s < 1, which is the so called suppression limit, a dataset with
m entries is considered anonymized even if bs mc entries needed
to be suppressed to fulfill the given privacy requirements [14].
Alternatively, ARX is able to automatically balance the application
of both coding models to achieve optimal utility. As a result of
tuple suppression, less generalization is required to ensure that
the remaining records fulfill the privacy model which increases
the utility of anonymized datasets [14]. In the output from Table 1
the last two records have been suppressed.
Our tool implements a globally-optimal anonymization algorithm
that uses utility measures to ensure that a data transformation
results in minimal loss of information. We support several well-
known methods. Some calculate data utility (also termed quality
or precision) of transformed datasets, while others calculate infor-
mation loss. As the ARX system uses utility measures only to com-
pare the results of different data transformations to each other,
both types of measures can be used interchangeably by defining
information loss to be the opposite of utility. A simple measure
for information loss is the Average Equivalence Class Size (AECS)
[15]. It is defined as the number of records in the dataset divided
by the number of equivalence classes. In terms of AECS, the gener-
alized dataset from Table 1 results in an information loss of 84 ¼ 2.
1.2. Objectives
Globally-optimal data anonymization algorithms construct a
solution space which is then searched for a data transformation
fulfilling a given privacy model while resulting in maximal utility
according to a given measure. To achieve scalability in this process,
they typically exclude parts of the solution space by predicting the
outcome of data transformations regarding privacy and utility
without explicitly applying them to the input dataset. These opti-
mizations are based on two well-known concepts, monotonicity
of privacy models and monotonicity of utility measures, which will
be explained in more detail in the following section. In this article,
we will show that both concepts are not directly applicable if data
is transformed with generalization and suppression. As a conse-
quence, existing algorithms fail to deliver optimal data utility.
Optimality of results can be guaranteed if the described optimiza-
tions are not implemented, but this significantly reduces perfor-
mance. As performance is important for anonymizing data with
user feedback, we had to develop a novel method to achieve
scalability.
In summary, we will present the following scientific contribu-
tions: (1) extensive experiments that clearly show that combining
generalization with tuple suppression leads to a significant
increase in data utility, (2) the first comprehensive study of mono-
tonicity of common privacy criteria and utility measures within a
coding model that uses generalization and suppression, (3) an
experimental evaluation that shows that existing anonymization
methods do not produce optimal results when data is anonymized
with generalization and tuple suppression, (4) a novel algorithm
which overcomes this limitation while ensuring scalability by
adopting existing optimization strategies to our context and by
combining different search methods, (5) a comprehensive evalua-
tion showing the efficiency and effectiveness of our approach.2. Material and methods
In this section, we will first quickly review basic concepts that
are central to our work. In particular, we will shortly describe com-
mon privacy threats, privacy models and utility measures. We will
then describe the transformation model investigated in this article.Next, we will introduce the monotonicity property for privacy
models and utility measures and describe common optimization
strategies. We will then study these concepts within a transforma-
tion model that combines generalization and suppression. Finally,
we will propose a novel approach and describe the experimental
setup used in our evaluation.
2.1. Privacy threats, privacy models and utility measures
In addition to identity disclosure, which we have already
explained in the previous section, two types of privacy threats
are commonly considered in statistical disclosure control [16].
First, membership disclosure means that linkage allows to deter-
mine whether or not data about an individual is contained in a
dataset [17]. Second, attribute disclosure means that an individual
can be linked with a sensitive attribute. An attribute is considered
sensitive if individuals do not want to be linked with it. This may
be achieved even without linking an individual to a specific item
in a dataset [18]. As an example, linkage to a set of data entries
allows inferring information if all items share a certain sensitive
attribute value.
To prevent such privacy breaches, ARX implements privacy
models that apply syntactic privacy criteria on a dataset. The tool
supports arbitrary combinations of four well-known privacy mod-
els. (1) k-Anonymity, which we have already defined in the previ-
ous section. (2) ‘-Diversity [18] and (3) t-closeness [19], which
aim at protecting datasets against disclosure of sensitive attribute
values. The former, requires that each sensitive attribute must
have at least ‘ ‘‘well represented” values in each equivalence class.
ARX implements three variants, which use different notions of
diversity: distinct-‘-diversity, which requires ‘ different sensitive
values per class, as well as recursive-(c, ‘)-diversity and entropy-
‘-diversity. The output dataset from Table 1 fulfills distinct-
2-diversity. t-Closeness requires that the distance between the
distribution of sensitive values in each equivalence class and their
overall distribution in the dataset must be lower than a given
threshold. (4) d-Presence, which aims at protecting datasets against
membership disclosure [17]. For overviews of further models the
interested reader is referred to [4,6,20].
In data anonymization, utility measures are used to automati-
cally compare data transformations to determine an optimal solu-
tion. In this article, we focus on the following four utility measures.
(1) Discernibility, which was introduced by Bayardo et al. [14]. It is
based on the sizes of the equivalence classes and introduces a
penalty for suppressed entries. (2) The Average Equivalence Class
Size measure, which was proposed by LeFevre et al. [21]. (3) The
Precision measure, which was proposed by Latanya Sweeney [22].
It summarizes the degree of generalization applied to all attribute
values. (4) Non-Uniform Entropy, which was proposed by Gionis
and Tassa [23]. It computes a distance between the distribution
of attribute values in an anonymized dataset and the distribution
of attribute values in the original dataset. Discernibility and AECS
are computed based on the sizes of the equivalence classes. In
the remainder of this article, we will therefore refer to them as
class-based measures. In contrast, Precision and Non-Uniform
Entropy are computed individually for each attribute and then
compiled into a global measure. We will therefore refer to them
as attribute-based measures. An overview of further utility mea-
sures can be found in [20].
2.2. Coding model and solution space
ARX and its search algorithm Flash utilize a coding model that
comprises global recoding with full-domain generalization followed
by local recodingwith tuple suppression [24]. For the purpose of this
article, we will resort to a slightly simplified classification of coding
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
(0,0)
(1,0) (0,1)
(2,0) (1,1)
(2,1)
Fig. 2. Example search space for a dataset with two quasi-identifiers. A generalization
lattice is a partially ordered set of all possible combinations of generalization levels
of each attribute. Lattices can be drawn as Hasse diagrams, which visualize the
transitive reduction of a set of transformations as an acyclic graph where each node
is connected to all of its direct successors and predecessors. A node represents a
transformation and defines generalization levels for all quasi-identifiers. An arrow
indicates that a transformation is a direct generalization of a more specialized
transformation that can be created by incrementing one of the generalization levels
defined by its predecessor. The original dataset is at the bottom (0, 0), whereas the
transformation with maximal generalization (2, 1) is at the top.
(0,0)
(1,0) (0,1)
(2,0) (1,1)
(2,1)
Anonymous transformation
Non-anonymous transformation
Monotonically decreasing utility
Fig. 3. Examples of monotonic privacy models and utility measures. A privacy criterion
is monotonic, if the fact that a dataset fulfills the criterion implies that any
generalization of the dataset fulfills the criterion as well. A utility measure is
monotonic if it is guaranteed that data utility will either decrease or remain the
same when a dataset is generalized. In the figure, the transformation (2, 0) must
therefore be the global optimum.
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article, global recoding means that the same transformation rule
is applied to all entries in the dataset, while local recoding means
that different transformations can be applied to different entries.
Full-domain generalization means that all values of an attribute
are generalized to the same level of the associated hierarchy. Tuple
suppression means that a complete record is replaced with a
semantic-free place-holder.
When global recoding with full-domain generalization is used
as a coding model, it is possible to model the search space as a gen-
eralization lattice, which is a partially ordered set of all possible
combinations of generalization levels of each attribute. In this arti-
cle, we will use the short term transformation to describe a combi-
nation of generalization levels for all quasi-identifiers. Lattices can
be visualized with Hasse diagrams, which in our context means to
draw the transitive reduction of a set of transformations in an
acyclic graph where each node is connected to all of its direct suc-
cessors and predecessors [25]. An example utilizing the hierarchies
for age and gender from Fig. 1 is shown in Fig. 2. Each node repre-
sents one transformation. An arrow indicates that a transformation
is a direct generalization of a more specialized transformation that
can be created by incrementing one of the generalization levels
defined by its predecessor. The original dataset is at the bottom
(0, 0), whereas the transformation with maximal generalization
(2, 1) is at the top. The output dataset from Table 1 can be pro-
duced by applying the transformation (1, 0) to the input data fol-
lowed by suppressing the last two entries. When a
transformation from the solution space is analyzed by the algo-
rithm, the coding model is applied as follows:
 Step 1: Generalize the dataset according to the given
transformation.
 Step 2: Suppress all entries in all equivalence classes that do not
fulfill the privacy model.
 Step 3: If the number of suppressed entries is lower than the
given threshold, the transformation is a solution
candidate.
 Step 4: If the transformation is a solution candidate, compute
the utility of the transformed dataset.
In the remainder of this article, we will call a data representa-
tion, a transformation or an equivalence class that do or do not ful-
fill a given set of privacy criteria anonymous or non-anonymous,
respectively.2.3. Monotonicity and pruning strategies
Monotonicity is an important concept for increasing the scalabil-
ity of globally-optimal anonymization algorithms. It is closely tied
to generalization and it also applies to the specific type of general-
ization used in our work [26]. Monotonicity can be a property of
utility measures as well as a property of privacy models.
A privacy criterion is monotonic, if the fact that a dataset fulfills
the criterion implies that any generalization of the dataset fulfills
the criterion as well [14,15]. It follows that in the type of solution
spaces investigated in this work, all (direct and indirect) general-
izations of a transformation that fulfills a privacy criterion also ful-
fill the privacy criterion [26]. It is easy to see that this implies the
reverse as well: all (direct and indirect) specializations of a trans-
formation that does not fulfill a privacy criterion will not fulfill
the criterion either. An example is shown in Fig. 3. Here, the fact
that the transformation (1, 1) is non-anonymous implies that the
transformations (1, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0) are also non-anonymous.
Moreover, as the transformation (2, 0) is anonymous, the transfor-
mation (2, 1) must be anonymous as well.A utility measure is monotonic if it is guaranteed that data util-
ity will either decrease or remain the same when a dataset is gen-
eralized [23,26]. It follows that in the type of solution spaces
covered in this article, all (direct and indirect) generalizations of
a transformation will have lower or the same utility. Again, it is
easy to see that this also implies the reverse: all (direct and indi-
rect) specializations of a transformation will have greater or equal
utility. As is shown in Fig. 3, this means that data utility decreases
monotonically on every path from the transformation with mini-
mal generalization (0, 0) to the transformation with maximal gen-
eralization (2, 1). Such paths have been called generalization
strategies by Emam et al. [26].
Monotonicity of privacy models and utility measures is fre-
quently used to increase the efficiency of globally-optimal
anonymization algorithms [15,26,24]. Firstly, the monotonicity of
privacy models allows to exclude predecessors of non-
anonymous transformations from the process of checking for
anonymity, as these are guaranteed to be non-anonymous as well.
Analogously, monotonicity of utility metrics allows to exclude suc-
cessors of anonymous transformations from the process of check-
ing for anonymity (as well as from the process of computing data
utility), as these can never result in better data utility. In the exam-
ple from Fig. 3, the transformation (2, 0) must therefore be the glo-
bal optimum.
In the remainder of this article, we will use the short term
privacy problem to describe a combination of privacy criteria for
which an optimal solution is to be found under a utility measure.
Moreover, we will call a privacy problem monotonic if it only
consists of monotonic criteria and a monotonic utility measure.
Analogously, we will call a privacy problem that only consists of
Fig. 4. Non-monotonicity of privacy models. The figure shows two generalizations of a dataset in which the attribute age is a quasi-identifier and diagnosis is a sensitive
attribute. The coding model has a suppression limit of 10 records.
Fig. 5. Non-monotonicity of utility measures. The figure shows an input dataset as
well as two generalizations. The attribute age is a quasi-identifier. The privacy
model is 2-anonymity. The coding model has a suppression limit of four records.
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non-monotonic privacy problem.2.4. Monotonicity of privacy models
All privacy criteria introduced previously (k-anonymity,
‘-diversity, t-closeness and d-presence) are monotonic when data
is transformed with generalization only [3,18,19,17]. A central
building block of the according proofs is the fact that generalizing
a dataset will lead to the merging of equivalence classes. The
property that generalizations of anonymous datasets are also
anonymous therefore follows directly from the fact that merging
two anonymous equivalence classes also results in an anonymous
equivalence class. It is easy to see that this holds for k-anonymity
and distinct-‘-diversity. Merging two classes with at least k entries
will of course also result in a class with at least k entries. Distinct-‘-
diversity requires each class to have at least ‘ distinct values of the
sensitive attribute. Again it is easy to see that merging two classes
with at least ‘ sensitive values will also result in a class with at
least ‘ sensitive values. Hence, both privacy models are monotonic
when data is transformed with generalization only. For proofs
regarding the other privacy criteria, the reader is referred to the
respective publications.
Many privacy problems that are monotonic when data is only
transformed with generalization become non-monotonic if the
coding model combines generalization with (subsequent) tuple
suppression with a suppression limit. Regarding privacy criteria,
the general problem is that generalization may lead to the merging
of a previously suppressed non-anonymous equivalence class with
an anonymous equivalence class. The result of this merging may bea non-anonymous class that cannot be suppressed because of the
suppression limit, rendering the overall dataset non-anonymous.
To give an overview of our methodology, we will in this section
sketch a proof for the non-monotonicity of an abstract privacy cri-
terion. Fig. 4 shows two generalizations of a dataset in which the
attribute age is a quasi-identifier and diagnosis is a sensitive attri-
bute. The suppression limit is assumed to be 10 records. In the
table on the left, the first two equivalence classes (entries 0–2
and 3–4) fulfill the privacy model, whereas the third class (entries
5–14) does not. The latter class can be suppressed, however, as it
consists of exactly 10 data entries. In the generalized dataset,
which is shown on the right, age is transformed into the interval
[20–79], which creates one equivalence class containing all entries.
This class is not anonymous and, as it contains more than 10
entries, it cannot be suppressed. The table on the right therefore
represents a non-anonymous generalization of an anonymous
dataset.
It is easy to see that the simple privacy models which we have
analyzed in the previous section are monotonic even with tuple
suppression. Merging a class with at least k entries with a class that
contains less than k entries, of course, also results in a class that
contains at least k entries. As a consequence, k-anonymity is mono-
tonic within the coding model investigated in this article [3]. The
same is true for distinct-‘-diversity, as merging a class with at least
‘ sensitive values with a class that contains less than ‘ sensitive
values also results in a class that contains at least ‘ sensitive values
[19].
More complex privacy models are not monotonic within the
coding model discussed here. This includes entropy-‘-diversity,
recursive-(c, ‘)-diversity, t-closeness (with equal, hierarchical and
numerical ground distance) and d-presence. Detailed proofs can
be found in Appendix A.2.5. Monotonicity of utility measures
Analogously to privacy models, well-known utility measures
are also not monotonic when the coding model consists of gener-
alization followed by tuple suppression. The reason is that an
increase of generalization may reduce the required amount of sup-
pression, effectively increasing overall data utility.
To provide an overview of our methodology, we will in this sec-
tion present a proof for the non-monotonicity of the AECS utility
measure. Fig. 5 shows three different representations of a dataset
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anonymity. As a coding model we use generalization with a hierar-
chy consisting of two levels: level 0 contains the original attribute
values and level 1 defines of intervals of size ten. Moreover, we use
tuple suppression with a limit of four records. Both transforma-
tions from Fig. 5 fulfill the privacy model.
The AECS measure is defined as the number of tuples in the
dataset divided by the number of equivalence classes [21]. It is
easy to see that for the first generalization the information loss
in terms of AECS is 62 ¼ 3 and for the second generalization the
information loss is 63 ¼ 2. This means that information loss
decreases when the dataset is generalized and thus the utility mea-
sure is not monotonic within the given coding model. The same is
true for all other utility measures described previously, i.e. Dis-
cernibility, Precision and Non-Uniform Entropy. Detailed proofs
can be found in Appendix B.2.6. Existing methods
In the literature, three algorithms have been described for effi-
cient globally-optimal data anonymization with full-domain gen-
eralization: Flash [24], OLA [26] and Incognito [15]. All three
approaches heavily exploit monotonicity and they were evaluated
for monotonic privacy problems only. In previous work, we have
shown that our own algorithm, Flash, outperforms the other
approaches when integrating them into ARX [24,27]. The main rea-
son for this is that Flash has been designed to make effective use of
our runtime environment by implementing a greedy depth-first
strategy. Additionally, Flash employs pruning in both directions
via binary movements [24]. OLA implements a divide-and-
conquer strategy, also combined with a binary component [26].
In contrast, Incognito’s approach is oriented towards dynamic pro-
gramming without a binary component [15].
We have also experimentally compared the three domain-
specific algorithms with a generic depth-first search (DFS) [27].
Our experiments showed that, within our runtime environment,
this very simple strategy offers competitive performance. Again,
this is due to its vertical search direction, which enables an effi-
cient execution of the algorithm by ARX. In contrast to the other
approaches, DFS can be used to perform an exhaustive search
through a complete solution space. The basic properties of these
four algorithms are summarized in Table 2.
While Flash, OLA and Incognito have not been designed to han-
dle non-monotonic privacy problems, they can be used for this
purpose as well. The reason for this is that they will always return
a transformation, which has explicitly been checked for privacy
[24]. As a consequence, the returned solution is guaranteed to ful-
fill the privacy model. They will, however, use information about
explicitly checked transformations to predictively classify other
transformations. This may lead to incorrect and inconsistent classi-
fications. As a result, some transformations in the solution space
may be classified as being privacy-preserving while they are actu-
ally not. Moreover, the final solution may not be the global opti-
mum. DFS, on the other hand, will correctly classify any solution
space and return the global optimum, as it will explicitly check
all transformations. It is obvious, however, that this comes at the
cost of a significant performance penalty.Table 2
Building blocks for a generic anonymization algorithm.
Algorithm Generic Strategy
Flash [24] No Greedy search
OLA [26] No Divide and con
Incognito [15] No Dynamic progr
DFS [27] Yes Linear search2.7. A novel approach
To overcome the limitations of existing methods, which means
to guarantee optimality of results while providing scalability, we
combined two approaches into a generic algorithm. Our approach,
which we call Two-Phase Flash or Flash2P , consists of two phases,
one for monotonic privacy problems and one for non-monotonic
privacy problems. Depending on the exact configuration it either
executes one of the two phases, or combines both of them. Fig. 6
summarizes the strategy implemented by Flash2P . If the coding
model only consists of generalization, ARX needs to solve a
monotonic privacy problem. This is the case when the suppression
limit is set to 0%. For such privacy problems ARX uses the Flash
algorithm, which is able to prune successors of anonymous trans-
formations (because of the monotonicity of utility measures) and
predecessors of non-anonymous transformations (because of the
monotonicity of privacy models).
A non-monotonic privacy problem is given if the privacy model
only consists of a set of instances of t-closeness or d-presence com-
bined with a coding model that is parameterized with a suppres-
sion limit of more than 0%. We have shown in the previous
sections that neither the privacy model nor the utility measure is
monotonic in such configurations. Therefore the complete solution
space must be searched. In this case ARX uses the DFS algorithm, as
it is the most efficient exhaustive search strategy according to our
experiments [27].
Finally, we combine both approaches into a strategy for
partially-monotonic privacy problems. We define these as privacy
problems with a non-monotonic utility measure (this applies to
all utility measures considered in this article under the given cod-
ing model, cf. Section 2.5) in which the set of privacy criteria either
explicitly contains a monotonic privacy criterion or implicitly
defines a monotonic privacy criterion. Regarding the methods cov-
ered in this article, this means that the privacy problem either con-
tains an instance of k-anonymity or an instance of ‘-diversity
combined with a coding model that is parameterized with a sup-
pression limit of more than 0%. In this case, the privacy model
implies a minimal equivalence class size of m, with either
m ¼ k;m ¼ ‘ or m ¼ maxðk; ‘Þ [20]. The property of a transforma-
tion not resulting in a minimal class size m is equal to the property
of not fulfilling m-anonymity, which is monotonic even with tuple
suppression (see Section 2.4). As a consequence, specializations of
transformations that do not fulfill m-anonymity can be pruned
from the search process. To exploit this property, we utilize two-
phases in which we first use the Flash algorithm to find all trans-
formations that fulfill m-anonymity and then the DFS algorithm
to check the remaining transformations for validity regarding
potentially existing additional privacy criteria and to compute
their utility.2.8. Experimental design
In this section, we will describe how we have performed an
experimental evaluation of our approach and existing methods
with several real-world datasets and a variety of different privacy
models. For our experiments we used the AnonBench benchmark-
ing environment for globally-optimal data anonymizationBinary search Direction
Yes Vertical
quer Yes Vertical
amming No Horizontal
No Vertical
Fig. 6. Combination of pruning strategies in our generic algorithm. Different parts of the search space can be pruned for monotonic, partially monotonic and non-monotonic
privacy problems. This is achieved by combining different anonymization algorithms.
Table 3
Evaluation datasets. We report the number of quasi-identifiers, the number of
transformations in the solution space, the number of records, the total number of
distinct values and the size of the file in CSV format.
Dataset Quasi-
identifiers
Transformations Records Distinct
values
Size
(MB)
ADULT 8 4,320 30,162 166 2.52
CUP 7 9,000 63,441 14,407 7.11
FARS 7 5,184 100,937 238 7.19
ATUS 8 8,748 539,253 305 84.03
IHIS 8 12,960 1,193,504 186 107.56
Table 4
Attributes of the evaluation datasets. We report the attributes selected as quasi-
identifiers (including the heights of the associated hierarchies) as well as the sensitive
attribute (including the number of distinct values).
Dataset Quasi-identifiers Sensitive attribute
ADULT sex (2), age (5), race (2), marital-status (3),
education (4), native-country (3), workclass
(3), salary-class (2)
occupation (14)
CUP zip (6), age (5), gender (2), income (3), state
(2), ngiftall (5), minramnt (5)
ramntall (814)
FARS iage (6), irace (3), ideathmon (4), ideathday
(4), isex (2), ihispanic (3), iinjury (3)
istatenum (51)
ATUS region (3), age (6), sex (2), race (3), marital
status (3), citizenship status (3), birthplace
(3), labor force status (3)
highest level of
school completed
(18)
IHIS year (6), quarter (3), region (3), pernum (4),
age (5), marstat (3), sex (2), racea (2)
educ (26)
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mentations are available online [12].
2.8.1. Datasets
Required parameters and outcomes of de-identification pro-
cesses depend on the input data, the research that is to be per-
formed with the resulting de-identified data, the recipients as
well as legal and regulatory environments. To cover a broad spec-
trum of data, we used five real-world datasets, most of which have
already been utilized for evaluating previous work on data
anonymization. The datasets included an excerpt of the 1994 US
census database (ADULT), data from the 1998 KDD Cup (CUP),
NHTSA crash statistics (FARS), data from the American Time Use
Survey (ATUS) and data from the Integrated Health Interview Ser-
ies (IHIS). The ADULT dataset serves as a de facto standard for the
evaluation of anonymization algorithms.
An overview of basic properties of the datasets is shown in
Table 3. The datasets contained between 30 k and 1.2 M records,
resulting in file sizes of between 2.52 MB and 107.56 MB. When
selecting quasi-identifiers, we considered lists of attributes that
have been associated with high risks of re-identification [5]. More-
over, we defined one sensitive attribute per dataset. As a sensitive
attribute, we always selected the attribute with the highest num-
ber of distinct values from the attributes which are not typical
quasi-identifiers. An exact specification of the quasi-identifiers
and the sensitive attributes is shown in Table 4. The generalization
hierarchies consisted of between 2 and 6 generalization levels. The
number of transformations in the search space, which is defined by
the product of the heights of the generalization hierarchies, ranged
from 4,320 for the ADULT dataset to 12,960 for the IHIS dataset.
2.8.2. Privacy models and parameters
Previous evaluations of anonymization algorithms focused on a
limited number of privacy models with varying parameters (i.e.
k; c; ‘; t and d) as well as varying numbers of quasi-identifiers.
These parameters influence the number of anonymous transforma-
tions in the search space which in turn influences execution times.
In contrast, we changed the characteristics of the solution space by
combining privacy criteria and by using different datasets. This
allowed us to cover a large number of potentially relevant privacyrequirements, including a broad spectrum of monotonic and non-
monotonic privacy problems.
We performed experiments for all reasonable combinations of
k-anonymity ðkÞ, ‘-diversity ð‘Þ, t-closeness ðtÞ and d-presence
ðdÞ. We combined k-anonymity with ‘-diversity ðk; ‘Þ, with t-
closeness ðk; tÞ and with d-presence ðk; dÞ. Moreover, we combined
d-presence with ‘-diversity ðd; ‘Þ and with t-closeness ðd; tÞ. Finally,
we combined k-anonymity and d-presence with ‘-diversity ðk; d; ‘Þ
and with t-closeness ðk; d; tÞ. The resulting 11 privacy models pro-
tect datasets against all possible combinations of identity, attribute
and membership disclosure.
As a parameter for k-anonymity we chose k ¼ 5 which is a typ-
ical value in the biomedical domain [28]. From the different vari-
ants that exist of ‘-diversity and t-closeness, we used the ones
that provide the best balance between utility and privacy, i.e.
recursive-ðc; ‘Þ-diversity and t-closeness with hierarchical ground
distance. As parameters, we chose c ¼ 4; ‘ ¼ 3 and t ¼ 0:2, which
have been proposed in the literature [18,19]. For d-presence we
chose dmin ¼ 0:05 and dmax ¼ 0:15 with a randomly selected
research subset containing 10% of the entries from the respective
dataset.
2.8.3. Experiments
In the first set of experiments, we investigated the impact of
combining generalization with tuple suppression on the utility of
anonymized datasets. To this end, we compared the information
loss resulting from anonymizing data with (1) generalization only
and with (2) generalization and suppression. In the second set of
experiments, we analyzed the utility of results of existing algo-
rithms when using the given coding model. For this purpose, we
compared the data utility of the results of Flash, OLA and Incognito
with the data utility of the optimal solution. The latter was deter-
mined with Flash2P. In the third and fourth set of experiments, we
evaluated the scalability of our approach. To this end, we analyzed
its pruning power as well as execution times.
Table 5
Anonymization with generalization and suppression compared to anonymization with
generalization only. Information loss is reported for four different utility measures
(Non-Uniform Entropy, Precision, Discernibility, AECS) and five different datasets
(ADULT, CUP, FARS, ATUS, IHIS). Values represent the information loss when
anonymizing data with generalization and suppression (5% suppression limit) as a
percentage of the information loss when anonymizing data with generalization only.
Dataset Dataset
ADULT (%) CUP (%) FARS (%) ATUS (%) IHIS (%)
Non-uniform entropy
ðkÞ 55 64 47 38 61
ð‘Þ 64 63 50 78 62
ðtÞ 94 70 67 89 100
ðdÞ 69 70 66 46 69
ðk; ‘Þ 64 64 51 78 68
ðk; tÞ 94 70 67 89 100
ðk; dÞ 78 71 72 59 74
ð‘; dÞ 74 69 61 76 77
ðt; dÞ 95 86 81 91 93
ðk; ‘; dÞ 74 71 64 76 77
ðk; t; dÞ 95 86 81 91 93
Precision
ðkÞ 48 39 24 23 39
ð‘Þ 57 38 26 54 41
ðtÞ 86 50 52 85 100
ðdÞ 54 49 35 31 43
ðk; ‘Þ 57 39 26 54 41
ðk; tÞ 86 50 52 85 100
ðk; dÞ 67 53 41 45 66
ð‘; dÞ 72 52 38 59 66
ðt; dÞ 93 67 59 85 96
ðk; ‘; dÞ 72 53 39 59 67
ðk; t; dÞ 93 67 59 85 96
Discernibility
ðkÞ 16 6 27 41 79
ð‘Þ 22 6 27 78 100
ðtÞ 82 8 22 84 100
ðdÞ 40 21 37 58 99
ðk; ‘Þ 22 6 28 78 100
ðk; tÞ 82 8 22 84 100
ðk; dÞ 43 11 17 63 65
ð‘; dÞ 28 9 17 73 66
ðt; dÞ 79 19 46 86 100
ðk; ‘; dÞ 29 11 17 74 66
ðk; t; dÞ 61 19 46 86 100
Average equivalence class size
ðkÞ 4 1 9 10 13
ð‘Þ 6 1 2 4 11
ðtÞ 21 2 6 12 100
ðdÞ 13 3 10 10 11
ðk; ‘Þ 6 1 2 4 15
ðk; tÞ 21 2 6 12 100
ðk; dÞ 24 2 14 23 16
ð‘; dÞ 15 1 5 9 18
ðt; dÞ 29 11 16 23 51
ðk; ‘; dÞ 15 2 6 10 18
ðk; t; dÞ 25 11 16 23 51
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3.1. Impact of tuple suppression on data utility
As described above, we compared the information loss resulting
from anonymizing data with generalization and suppression with
the information loss resulting from anonymizing data with gener-
alization only. We tested all utility measures investigated in this
article: Non-Uniform Entropy, Precision, Discernibility and Average
Equivalence Class Size (AECS). The results are shown in Table 5.
As can be seen, the numbers clearly show that even a moderate
suppression limit of 5% leads to a significant increase in data util-
ity. In our experiments, we observed this effect for all datasets andutility measures. Information loss decreased by up to 99% (CUP
dataset, utility measured with AECS). The effectiveness depended
on the utility measure. On average, the highest increase was
measured with AECS and the lowest increase was measured with
Non-Uniform Entropy. However, even utility measured with
Non-Monotonic Entropy increased by up to 62% (ATUS dataset,
k-anonymity). Regarding the effect on different datasets, on aver-
age, the lowest increase in data utility was achieved for the IHIS
dataset. The reason is that this dataset contains a large number
of entries and many privacy models can therefore be fulfilled with
very little generalization. However, even for this dataset utility was
increased by up to 39% when measured with Non-Uniform Entropy
(k-anonymity), 61% when measured with Precision (k-anonymity),
35% when measured with Discernibility (k-anonymity + d-presence)
and 89% when measured with AECS (‘-diversity and d-presence). In
summary, the results highlight the value of tuple suppression for
anonymizing data with high quality output.3.2. Impact of not considering non-monotonicity
Next, we studied how important it is – in terms of data utility –
to consider monotonicity when designing anonymizing algorithms
for the coding model investigated in this article. To this end, we
anonymized the datasets with Flash, OLA and Incognito using dif-
ferent suppression limits, privacy models and utility measures. We
report the utility of their solutions relative to the utility of the opti-
mal solution, which we have determined with our novel approach.
The results obtained for the Flash algorithm with a 100% sup-
pression limit are shown in Table 6. We note that such a suppres-
sion limit does not mean that 100% of the data records have been
suppressed. It simply means that ARX was free to automatically
balance both types of data recoding to achieve optimal utility.
Moreover, we note that Flash was the best performing algorithm
in terms of data utility in our experiments. It can be seen that
the output quality of Flash was worse than the optimum by up
to several orders of magnitude for class-based measures (e.g.
Discernibility, IHIS, k-anonymity). For attribute-based measures
output utility was worse than the optimum by up to 42% for
Non-Uniform Entropy (IHIS, ‘-diversity) and by up to 53% for
Precision (e.g. IHIS, t-closeness combined with d-presence). Com-
paring the results for different datasets, IHIS was the dataset with
the largest differences in data utility. Moreover, existing
algorithms failed to produce datasets with optimal utility in almost
all cases, with ATUS, Precision, k-anonymity and ATUS, Precision,
d-presence being the only exceptions.
Existing algorithms have been designed to anonymize data with
generalization only. The results reported in Table 6 are on the
opposite end of the spectrum, as the suppression limit of 100%
enables ARX to automatically balance the application of general-
ization and suppression. Consequently, we also studied, how the
output quality of existing algorithms is affected by suppression
limits that are lower than 100%. The results are shown in Fig. 7.
As we performed a large number of experiments with different
suppression limits, we summarized the results for clarity. Each
data point represents the information loss achieved for a specific
utility measure on average (in terms of the geometric mean) for
all datasets and privacy models. This means that each point sum-
marizes one table similar to the ones shown in Table 6.
It can be seen that, obviously, existing algorithms did find the
optimal solution for a 0% suppression limit. On average, Flash per-
formed better than OLA and OLA performed better than Incognito.
With all algorithms, output quality decreased with increasing sup-
pression limits. In general, also the strength of the effect increased
with increasing suppression limit. The effect was stronger for class-
based measures. We note that even with a moderate suppression
Table 6
Data utility when not considering non-monotonicity with a 100% suppression limit.
Information loss is reported for four different utility measures (Non-Uniform Entropy,
Precision, Discernibility, AECS) and five different datasets (ADULT, CUP, FARS, ATUS,
IHIS). Values represent the utility of the output of existing approaches (Flash)
compared to the utility of the optimal solution.
Criteria Dataset
ADULT (%) CUP (%) FARS (%) ATUS (%) IHIS (%)
Non-uniform entropy
ðkÞ 79 78 74 91 75
ð‘Þ 72 75 73 92 58
ðtÞ 67 72 87 86 65
ðdÞ 82 79 77 89 80
ðk; ‘Þ 72 76 73 92 58
ðk; tÞ 67 72 87 86 65
ðk; dÞ 76 73 83 86 68
ð‘; dÞ 75 73 84 88 76
ðt; dÞ 72 72 96 81 60
ðk; ‘; dÞ 75 72 85 87 76
ðk; t; dÞ 72 72 96 81 60
Precision
ðkÞ 91 78 77 100 64
ð‘Þ 92 72 81 77 58
ðtÞ 86 56 78 94 52
ðdÞ 87 73 74 100 63
ðk; ‘Þ 92 71 80 77 58
ðk; tÞ 86 56 78 94 52
ðk; dÞ 92 59 75 98 75
ð‘; dÞ 98 60 80 77 79
ðt; dÞ 83 53 92 83 47
ðk; ‘; dÞ 98 58 81 78 80
ðk; t; dÞ 83 53 92 83 47
Discernibility
ðkÞ 9 3 8 22 1
ð‘Þ 10 2 7 34 5
ðtÞ 19 2 9 25 <1
ðdÞ 13 4 16 20 2
ðk; ‘Þ 10 2 7 33 5
ðk; tÞ 19 2 9 25 <1
ðk; dÞ 18 3 18 14 1
ð‘; dÞ 15 2 15 30 2
ðt; dÞ 22 3 29 19 1
ðk; ‘; dÞ 16 3 15 30 2
ðk; t; dÞ 22 3 29 19 1
Average equivalence class size
ðkÞ 73 51 58 99 81
ð‘Þ 78 39 48 97 76
ðtÞ 15 39 52 65 8
ðdÞ 74 60 60 98 73
ðk; ‘Þ 75 44 51 97 72
ðk; tÞ 15 39 52 65 8
ðk; dÞ 46 50 57 88 62
ð‘; dÞ 42 55 55 76 60
ðt; dÞ 8 6 47 40 1
ðk; ‘; dÞ 39 48 56 72 56
ðk; t; dÞ 8 6 47 40 1
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Fig. 7. Data utility of the output of existing approaches compared to the utility of the optim
averages of all combinations of datasets and privacy models.
Table 7
Pruning power of Flash and of Flash2P for monotonic privacy problems (0% suppression
limit). We report the percentage of transformations excluded from the search space.
Criteria Dataset
ADULT (%) CUP (%) FARS (%) ATUS (%) IHIS (%)
ðkÞ 97.3 99.6 98.4 97.3 98.3
ð‘Þ 97.7 99.6 99.3 99.5 98.6
ðtÞ 99.2 99.7 99.5 99.1 99.1
ðdÞ 96.7 99.4 97.1 97.3 97.8
ðk; ‘Þ 97.7 99.6 99.3 99.5 98.6
ðk; tÞ 99.2 99.7 99.5 99.1 99.1
ðk; dÞ 98.4 99.7 98.5 98.0 98.7
ð‘; dÞ 98.9 99.7 99.1 99.5 99.1
ðt; dÞ 99.4 99.7 99.5 99.6 99.7
ðk; ‘; dÞ 98.9 99.7 99.1 99.5 99.1
ðk; t; dÞ 99.4 99.7 99.5 99.6 99.7
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in at least two experiments with each utility measure.3.3. Pruning power of Flash2P
As we have explained in the previous section, Flash2P will
always return a data transformation with optimal utility. To avoid
exhaustive searches through the complete solution space and thus
provide scalability, it thereby combines different pruning strate-
gies. In the experiments presented in this section, we anonymized
each dataset with each of the 11 privacy models and suppression
limits of 0% and 5% to analyze the pruning power of our approach.
In our context, pruning power means the ability to exclude trans-
formations from the search space. As a utility measure we used
Non-Uniform Entropy. We report the relative number of pruned
transformations for all monotonic and partially monotonic privacy
problems.
Table 7 shows the pruning power achieved for the monotonic
setup with a 0% suppression limit. In these experiments, the poten-
tial for pruning transformations from the search process was max-
imal. Therefore, the numbers can be seen as a gauge for exploiting
monotonicity. Flash’s binary pruning strategy is very effective and
it excluded at least 96% of the search space in all cases. We note
that this is the usage scenario for which existing algorithms, such
as Incognito, OLA and Flash, have been designed.
Results for partially monotonic setups (with a 5% suppression
limit), in which Flashwas combinedwith DFS, are shown in Table 8.
Compared to the previous experiments, pruning power was
reduced significantly. Still, however, up to more than 84% of the
search space were pruned for some configurations. Variability
was rather high, reflecting the differences in difficulty for achieving
different privacy criteria. The effectiveness of pruning transforma-iscernibility         AECS
 60  80  100
n limit [%]
lgorithm
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Suppression limit [%]
(c) Incognito algorithm
al solution for different suppression limits. Information loss is reported as workload
Table 8
Pruning power of Flash2P for partially monotonic privacy problems (5% suppression limit).
We report the percentage of transformations excluded from the search space.
Criteria Dataset
ADULT (%) CUP (%) FARS (%) ATUS (%) IHIS (%)
ðkÞ 29.6 67.1 13.7 2.0 2.4
ð‘Þ 24.8 64.3 11.1 1.2 1.8
ðk; ‘Þ 29.6 67.1 13.7 2.0 2.4
ðk; tÞ 29.6 67.1 13.7 2.0 2.4
ðk; dÞ 70.6 84.7 44.7 28.6 18.9
ð‘; dÞ 65.6 83.3 40.1 23.1 15.9
ðk; ‘; dÞ 70.6 84.7 44.7 28.6 18.9
ðk; t; dÞ 70.6 84.7 44.7 28.6 18.9
Table 9
Performance of Flash2P for monotonic privacy problems (0% suppression limit). We report
execution times in seconds, as well as execution times relative to the times of DFS.
Dataset
ADULT CUP FARS ATUS IHIS
ðkÞ 00.03
(03.7%)
00.04
(00.2%)
00.07
(03.3%)
00.23
(02.2%)
02.40
(04.8%)
ð‘Þ 00.04
(01.5%)
00.09
(00.2%)
00.06
(00.8%)
00.14
(00.4%)
02.99
(02.1%)
ðtÞ 00.02
(00.8%)
00.08
(00.2%)
00.05
(00.7%)
00.17
(00.5%)
01.82
(01.3%)
ðdÞ 00.04
(04.3%)
00.04
(00.2%)
00.09
(03.8%)
00.27
(02.3%)
03.61
(06.0%)
ðk; ‘Þ 00.04
(01.5%)
00.09
(00.2%)
00.06
(00.8%)
00.14
(00.4%)
02.89
(02.0%)
ðk; tÞ 00.02
(00.9%)
00.08
(00.2%)
00.05
(00.7%)
00.17
(00.5%)
01.80
(01.2%)
ðk; dÞ 00.02
(02.4%)
00.03
(00.1%)
00.06
(02.6%)
00.19
(01.6%)
02.23
(03.8%)
ð‘; dÞ 00.02
(01.0%)
00.05
(00.1%)
00.06
(01.1%)
00.13
(00.5%)
01.71
(01.5%)
ðt; dÞ 00.02
(00.8%)
00.05
(00.1%)
00.04
(00.8%)
00.13
(00.5%)
00.58
(00.5%)
ðk; ‘; dÞ 00.02
(01.0%)
00.05
(00.1%)
00.06
(01.1%)
00.14
(00.5%)
01.64
(01.4%)
ðk; t; dÞ 00.02
(00.8%)
00.05
(00.1%)
00.04
(00.8%)
00.13
(00.5%)
00.57
(00.5%)
Table 10
Performance of Flash2P for partially monotonic privacy problems (5% suppression limit).
We report execution times in seconds, as well as execution times relative to the times
of DFS.
Dataset
ADULT CUP FARS ATUS IHIS
ðkÞ 00.54
(61.9%)
01.43
(06.7%)
01.18
(50.5%)
12.33
(90.1%)
50.34
(90.3%)
ð‘Þ 01.59
(62.6%)
09.73
(22.5%)
06.05
(67.8%)
29.96
(94.8%)
135.03
(87.9%)
ðk; ‘Þ 01.40
(55.0%)
07.91
(18.6%)
05.44
(62.5%)
28.35
(89.3%)
133.56
(86.7%)
ðk; tÞ 01.31
(53.4%)
08.93
(19.6%)
04.48
(57.1%)
28.31
(88.8%)
126.77
(86.1%)
ðk; dÞ 00.27
(29.5%)
00.47
(02.2%)
00.62
(24.8%)
04.50
(37.3%)
43.21
(71.6%)
ð‘; dÞ 00.44
(22.3%)
01.08
(02.9%)
01.53
(27.2%)
11.03
(43.0%)
78.87
(66.4%)
ðk; ‘; dÞ 00.37
(18.7%)
00.97
(02.8%)
01.27
(22.3%)
09.56
(37.5%)
72.07
(60.3%)
ðk; t; dÞ 00.36
(18.3%)
01.08
(03.1%)
01.16
(21.0%)
09.47
(37.1%)
69.38
(59.2%)
Table 11
Performance of Flash2P for non-monotonic privacy problems (5% suppression limit). We
report execution times in seconds.
Dataset
ADULT CUP FARS ATUS IHIS
ðtÞ 02.47 60.33 08.15 31.63 146.42
ðdÞ 00.94 21.62 02.51 12.77 61.72
ðt; dÞ 01.93 49.09 05.62 25.55 117.15
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amount of generalization that was required for solving a privacy
problem. For example, independent of the dataset, pruning power
increased for privacy problems that included d-presence, as this
criterion was the most difficult to achieve.
3.4. Performance of Flash2P
In this section, we present experiments that we performed to
analyze the effect of pruning on execution times. To this end, we
compared the execution times of Flash2P with the execution times
of an exhaustive depth-first search (DFS). For measuring informa-
tion loss we used Non-Uniform Entropy, which is the most compu-
tationally complex utility measure supported by our software. We
anonymized each dataset with each of the 11 privacy models and
suppression limits of 0% and 5%, which resulted in a total of 110
experiments. The software is implemented in Java and the experi-
ments were performed on a desktop machine with a quad-core
3.1 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU running a 64-bit Linux 3.2.0 kernel and
a 64-bit Sun JVM (1.7.0).
Table 9 shows the execution times of our approach measured
when anonymizing the five datasets with monotonic configura-
tions. Here, Flash2P outperformed DFS by up to three orders of mag-
nitude. This reflects its pruning power of at least 96%, which
resulted in execution times between 0.1% and 6% of the execution
times of DFS. On average, the largest increase in performance was
achieved for the CUP dataset, the smallest increase was achievedfor the IHIS dataset. Total execution times basically depended on
the number of records in the datasets and they varied between
0.02 and 0.04 s for the ADULT dataset and between 0.57 and
3.61 s for the IHIS dataset. We measured no significant differences
in performance for different privacy models.
Table 10 shows the execution times of our approach when
anonymizing the five datasets with partially monotonic configura-
tions. In this setup, Flash2P performed two phases. It achieved
speedups of up to a factor of 45 compared to DFS (CUP,
k-anonymity and d-presence). In some experiments we measured
only small performance improvements (e.g. 5% for ATUS,
‘-diversity). It can be seen, that the decrease of execution times
of Flash2P in comparison with DFS roughly corresponds with the
percentage of transformations excluded from the search process.
However, in most experiments, the speedup was actually greater
than the pruning power suggested. The reason for this effect lies
in the design of the ARX runtime environment, which stores snap-
shots of transformed data throughout the anonymization process
[24]. When parts of the solution space are excluded, pressure on
memory is reduced, allowing the system to store and use more
relevant snapshots during the search process.
Table 11 shows the execution times of our approach when
anonymizing the five datasets with non-monotonic configurations.
For these privacy problems, the execution times of Flash2P were
equal to the execution times of DFS, as there was no potential for
pruning. Compared to the previous experiments, execution times
increased significantly. Basically, the times correlate with the sizes
of the datasets and the sizes of the corresponding search spaces.
The only exception is the CUP dataset. In this case, the anonymiza-
tion process was more difficult to optimize by our runtime envi-
ronment, as the dataset contains a much higher number of
distinct attribute values than the other datasets. This reduces the
number of compressed snapshots that can be created during the
search process. Total execution times were measured between
0.94 and 2.47 s for the ADULT dataset and between 61.72 and
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privacy problem, execution times increased by roughly a factor of
two. This reflects the additional work that was spent on maintain-
ing frequency distributions of sensitive attribute values.
4. Discussion
In this work, we have shown that it is challenging to implement
algorithmic solutions for de-identifying structured data with syn-
tactic privacy models and complex coding models. This imposes
a high barrier to data controllers and researchers who want to test
their practical usefulness and ultimately implement them into
day-to-day data processing. One of our major motivations for
developing the ARX system has been to improve access to methods
of data anonymization.
The coding model investigated in this article has been recom-
mended for the biomedical domain. First, it is intuitive and thus
easy to understand, second, it produces datasets that are well sui-
ted for analyses by epidemiologists, and, thirdly, the transforma-
tion process can easily be configured by non-experts [26]. Also,
combining generalization with tuple suppression significantly
increases data utility (see Section 3.1).
While we have focused on this specific coding model, our find-
ings are applicable to other methods of data transformation as
well. For example, the privacy models and utility measures covered
in this article are also non-monotonic within a coding model con-
sisting of full-domain generalization and cell suppression. This is
easy to see, as cell suppression, in which individual values are sup-
pressed instead of complete data entries, and tuple suppression are
identical for datasets consisting of only one quasi-identifier. More-
over, our results also apply to coding models that combine sup-
pression with subtree generalization [20].
We have experimentally confirmed that existing globally-
optimalmethods fail to deliver optimal utility in our setup. Our find-
ings also apply to heuristic anonymization algorithms for Big Data
that use the concept ofminimal anonymization [20]. This means that
they assume that an anonymous generalized data representation
that cannot be specialized without violating the privacy model has
good data utility. Our results show that, in complex coding models,
minimalityhasno implications in termsof datautility, as the latter is
not directly correlatedwith the degree of generalization. Thefinding
applies to past approaches, such as DataFly [29], as well as more
recent developments, such as the work by Babu et al. [30].
There is an ongoing discussion about the practical relevance of
syntactic privacy models against attribute and membership disclo-
sure [31]. Critics argue that they are rarely used in practice, as they
result in unacceptable data quality. We plan to further investigate
this. To date, it has been argued that such techniques are potentially
important [32] and we could not find publications demonstrating
that such methods fail to provide adequate output. We emphasize
that our results are also relevant for implementing safeguards
against identity disclosure (i.e. re-identification), the importance
of which is widely recognized [8,32,31]. This includes models such
as k-anonymity as well as approaches for risk-based anonymization
(see, e.g. [33]). Within the coding model investigated in this article,
the former represents a partially monotonic privacy problem, while
the latter is a non-monotonic privacy problem. As a simple example,
consider the average re-identification risk, which may be estimated
with the average equivalence class size [34]. The same measure
canbe used for estimating data utility and it is notmonotonicwithin
the given coding model (see Section 2.5).
4.1. Limitations
The techniques investigated in this work are an important
building block for protecting sensitive biomedical data. However,they can only provide very specific guarantees which require
rather strong assumptions about the goals and the background
knowledge of an attacker. Semantic privacy models such as Differ-
ential Privacy [7] require less such assumptions but usually involve
stronger trade-offs in terms of data utility or supported workflows
[35,4]. Which approach provides a better balance between utility
and privacy is subject to ongoing discussions (see, e.g. [36,37]).
The protection of personal health data against privacy threats is
a challenging task and data controllers should follow the onion
layer principle by employing multiple layers of safeguards. A very
widespread approach to minimize risks in data sharing are data
use agreements. Their use is essential for HIPAA’s limited data
set [8]. They are contracts that define rights and duties and that
hold data recipients responsible to comply with relevant terms,
conditions and regulations. Specifically, recipients will have to take
adequate measures to protect data confidentiality and to make
sure that they are fully considering the original informed consent,
ethics committee approval and data access committee decisions. In
this context, Malin et al. [38] have proposed specific technical and
policy approaches for data sharing in clinical and translational
research. Apart from data use agreements and data access commit-
tees, important recommendations are to include the description of
risks of data aggregation and sharing already in the informed con-
sent and to use multiple levels of access. Depending on which addi-
tional safeguards are implemented, different options for data de-
identification may be used [39].4.2. Conclusions
Our work is the first systematic study describing how to imple-
ment generalization and suppression when biomedical data is to
be anonymized with common syntactic privacy models and utility
measures. Implementing this transformation model leads to a
strong increase in utility compared to anonymizing data with gen-
eralization only. The resulting recommendation is to use this
model preferably. Moreover, common privacy models and utility
measures are non-monotonic when data are transformed with
generalization followed by tuple suppression. As a consequence,
existing anonymization algorithms fail to produce output with
optimal quality. Our novel approach overcomes this limitation
while providing scalability.
By considering the findings described in this article, we were
able to significantly improve the data anonymization tool ARX.
With the implementation of the described methods, the software
is able to anonymize data with generalization and suppression
while guaranteeing the optimality of results in terms of data util-
ity. Moreover, ARX remains scalable and supports the anonymiza-
tion of very large datasets with complex privacy models on
commodity hardware. Our tool is available as open source software
[12].
While the coding model, privacy models and utility measures
covered in this article are well known, our work is the first to
investigate an integrated implementation. Our results apply to
methods which are being used for protecting datasets from re-
identification, which is a requirement in many laws and regula-
tions worldwide. Moreover, the coding model investigated in this
work has been recommended for use in the biomedical domain.
Our results should therefore be considered when anonymizing
structured biomedical data.Conflict of interest
None declared.
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